# Harmonisation of Enforcement Mechanisms for International Mediated Settlement Agreements:

# A Critical Appraisal of the Singapore Convention on Mediation in the Context of Domestic Legal Systems

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#### Abstract

The increasing reliance on mediation as a preferred method for resolving cross-border commercial disputes has underscored the pressing need for effective enforcement mechanisms for International Mediated Settlement Agreements (iMSAs). Despite mediation's inherent advantages—such as party autonomy, confidentiality, and flexibility—the fragmented and inconsistent enforcement frameworks across jurisdictions historically impeded its global efficacy. Prior to the advent of the Singapore Convention on Mediation (2019), parties often relied on domestic contract enforcement or attempted to analogize enforcement through arbitral frameworks, leading to unpredictability and legal uncertainty.

This paper critically appraises the Singapore Convention on Mediation as a landmark initiative aimed at harmonizing the enforcement of iMSAs. It explores the Convention's genesis, scope, and enforcement provisions, while assessing its potential to bridge jurisdictional divergences. By contextualizing the Convention within legal theories of harmonisation and international private law, the study evaluates its ability to unify diverse domestic enforcement regimes without undermining national sovereignty.

Through a comparative lens, the paper examines domestic implementation challenges faced by key jurisdictions such as India, the USA, Singapore, and the UK/EU, highlighting compatibility issues, legislative gaps, and judicial preparedness. It further explores the tension between uniformity and flexibility, and the evolving role of courts in interpreting and applying the Convention's provisions.

Ultimately, the study assesses whether the Convention represents a step towards genuine legal harmonisation or introduces new complexities into the global mediation landscape. It concludes with practical recommendations for legislative reforms, model implementation guidelines, and judicial capacity-building, emphasizing the role of international cooperation and UNCITRAL's continued stewardship in promoting a coherent and effective global mediation enforcement regime.

**Keywords:** Singapore Convention on Mediation, International Mediated Settlement Agreements, Cross-Border Dispute Resolution, UNCITRAL, Domestic Implementation, mediation law, ADR frameworks.

#### Introduction

#### A. Background of Study

### Rise of Mediation in Cross-Border Dispute Resolution

In the evolving landscape of global commerce, dispute resolution mechanisms have undergone significant transformation. As international trade has expanded in both volume and complexity, so too has the demand for efficient, cost-effective, and business-friendly methods of resolving disputes. Traditionally, litigation and arbitration have dominated the dispute resolution space. However, both methods come with notable limitations—litigation is often adversarial, time-consuming, and jurisdictionally restricted, while arbitration, though private and flexible, is not always cost-effective or conducive to preserving business relationships.

Against this backdrop, mediation has emerged as a promising alternative. Mediation is a consensual, non-binding process wherein a neutral third party facilitates communication and negotiation between disputing parties with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable solution. Unlike adversarial processes, mediation is collaborative and encourages the preservation of commercial relationships. The key attributes of mediation—party autonomy, confidentiality, flexibility, and control over the outcome—make it particularly suitable for resolving international commercial disputes.

Global institutions such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and the World Bank have increasingly advocated for the integration of mediation into dispute

resolution frameworks. Many international contracts now incorporate multi-tier dispute resolution clauses, where mediation is a precondition to arbitration or litigation. The increased institutionalization of mediation through platforms such as the ICC Mediation Rules, WIPO Mediation Rules, and the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) has further legitimized mediation as a serious tool for transnational dispute resolution.

However, despite these advantages and global promotion, mediation's potential has not been fully realized—particularly in the international arena. One of the most significant barriers has been the lack of a uniform, predictable, and effective framework for the **enforcement of mediated settlement agreements**, especially when such agreements need to be recognized and enforced across borders.

#### The Need for Enforceability of International Mediated Settlement Agreements (iMSAs)

The cornerstone of mediation's effectiveness lies in the enforceability of the mediated settlement agreement (MSA). In international settings, parties to cross-border contracts often belong to different legal systems. When these parties resolve their disputes through mediation and arrive at a settlement, they expect that the agreement will be honoured and enforceable irrespective of jurisdiction.

However, the absence of a harmonised international enforcement mechanism creates uncertainty. While domestic settlements may be enforceable under national laws, international mediated settlement agreements (iMSAs) often fall into a grey area. In the absence of a specific international convention, enforcement typically depended on local contract law, requiring a separate lawsuit in a national court to enforce the terms of the MSA. This undermined mediation's appeal by reintroducing the very litigation that parties sought to avoid. Moreover, inconsistencies in enforcement practices across jurisdictions diminished confidence in mediation's reliability as a global dispute resolution mechanism.

In comparison, international arbitration enjoys robust support under the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. This Convention ensures that arbitral awards made in one contracting state are recognized and enforceable in others, subject to limited exceptions. The success of the New York Convention highlighted the need for a similar mechanism in the field of mediation.

Thus, the development of an international legal instrument to address the enforceability of iMSAs became a pressing need—both to fill a critical gap in the global ADR landscape and to encourage the wider adoption of mediation for cross-border commercial disputes.

## B. The Problem of Fragmentation in Enforcement Mechanisms Variations Across Jurisdictions

Prior to the adoption of the Singapore Convention on Mediation, the global legal framework for enforcing iMSAs was marked by legal fragmentation and jurisdictional divergence. Each country adopted its own rules regarding the enforceability of mediated agreements, often treating them as mere contracts rather than binding instruments deserving direct execution.

For instance, in the **United States**, mediated agreements were generally enforceable as contracts under state law. Some states offered court-annexed mediation programs where court approval conferred enforceability akin to a consent judgment, but such recognition was not consistent at the federal level for foreign iMSAs. In the **European Union**, the Mediation Directive (2008/52/EC) aimed to promote mediation in civil and commercial matters. However, it only provided for a soft recognition regime, without binding enforcement across Member States. In **India**, although Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure and recent legislative efforts such as the Mediation Bill, 2021 (now enacted), encourage mediation, enforcement of MSAs still required court proceedings under contract law, unless the MSA was converted into a consent decree. In **Singapore**, a progressive jurisdiction, MSAs could be registered and enforced under the Mediation Act 2017, but this applied primarily to domestic disputes.

These jurisdictional differences meant that parties could not be sure that a mediated settlement reached in one country would be recognized or enforced in another. The uncertainty discouraged parties from using mediation for international matters, as they were unsure whether they would be able to enjoy the fruits of their negotiated settlements abroad.

#### **Limitations Before the Singapore Convention**

Before the advent of the Singapore Convention, parties had few options to secure cross-border enforcement of iMSAs:

- 1. **Contractual Enforcement**: Treating the MSA as a contract, a party would have to initiate fresh litigation or arbitration proceedings in the jurisdiction where enforcement was sought. This involved costs, time, and procedural uncertainty.
- 2. Conversion into Arbitral Awards: In some cases, parties attempted to enforce MSAs by converting them into arbitral awards under the New York Convention. This was done by submitting the MSA to arbitration and requesting the tribunal to render a consent award. While clever, this approach was procedurally complex and not always legally tenable, particularly in jurisdictions where arbitration required a live dispute.

3. **Domestic Court Orders**: Some legal systems allowed the MSA to be submitted to a court for approval, thereby transforming it into a court order. However, such procedures were often cumbersome and applicable only to domestic MSAs. The absence of a uniform mechanism not only created enforcement difficulties but also eroded one of the key benefits of mediation—finality. This lack of legal certainty stymied the growth of mediation in the international commercial arena, which otherwise had the potential to transform how businesses resolved disputes.

## C. Significance of the Singapore Convention on Mediation (2019) Aims and Expectations

In response to these challenges, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the **Singapore Convention on Mediation** on 20 December 2018, and it was opened for signature on 7 August 2019. Officially titled the *United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation*, the Convention seeks to fill the gap in the international legal framework governing the enforcement of iMSAs.

The primary objective of the Convention is to establish a **uniform**, **efficient**, **and predictable framework** for the enforcement of international mediated settlement agreements. By doing so, it aims to place mediation on an equal footing with arbitration and litigation in terms of enforceability. The Convention is intended to enhance legal certainty, promote the use of mediation in international commercial disputes, and encourage parties to consider mediation as a viable and enforceable method of dispute resolution.

The Convention applies to settlement agreements resulting from mediation that resolve commercial disputes and are international in nature. Its key provisions include:

- Article 1: Establishes the scope of application, applying to international settlement agreements resulting from mediation.
- Article 3: Mandates that each Party to the Convention shall enforce settlement agreements in accordance with its rules of procedure and under the conditions laid down in the Convention.
- Article 5: Provides grounds for refusal of enforcement, such as incapacity of a party, invalidity of the agreement, serious breach of mediator standards, or public policy concerns.
- As of April 2025, the Convention has been signed by over 55 countries, including major economies such as China, India, Singapore, and the United States. Several of these have already completed the ratification process and are working toward domestic implementation.
- The expectations surrounding the Convention are multifold:
- **Legal Harmonisation**: The Convention is expected to harmonise enforcement rules, thereby reducing jurisdictional disparities.
- **Promoting Mediation**: By offering a predictable enforcement mechanism, the Convention encourages parties to adopt mediation without fear of non-enforceability.
- **Judicial Efficiency**: With fewer cases reaching courts and arbitration tribunals, the Convention supports judicial economy and access to justice.
- **Business Confidence**: Commercial parties, particularly SMEs, can resolve disputes faster and at lower costs, enhancing global trade confidence.
- However, for the Convention to succeed, it must be effectively integrated into domestic legal systems, interpreted consistently by national courts, and supported by legal professionals and ADR institutions. These aspects, along with critical implementation challenges, will be examined in the forthcoming sections of this paper.

## Conceptual and Legal Framework

#### A. Mediation: Meaning, Principles, and Benefits

Mediation is a structured, voluntary, and confidential dispute resolution process in which an impartial third party—the mediator—facilitates communication and negotiation between disputing parties to assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Unlike adjudicative processes such as litigation and arbitration, mediation is non-binding in nature, placing the emphasis on collaboration, autonomy, and creative problem-solving.

At the heart of mediation lie several core principles that distinguish it from other dispute resolution methods:

#### Voluntariness

Voluntariness is the cornerstone of mediation. Parties enter the process of their own free will and may exit at any time. This principle not only preserves party autonomy but also fosters a cooperative spirit, increasing the likelihood of reaching a consensus-based solution.

#### Confidentiality

Confidentiality ensures that discussions, disclosures, and documents shared during mediation remain private and cannot be used in subsequent legal proceedings, unless otherwise agreed. This principle promotes candour, protects reputations, and provides a safe space for parties to explore settlement options without fear of legal repercussions.

#### Party Autonomy

Mediation embodies the principle of self-determination. The mediator does not impose a decision; rather, parties control both the process and the outcome. This empowers parties to craft tailor-made solutions that align with their underlying interests, fostering a sense of ownership and compliance.

The benefits of mediation, particularly in international commercial disputes, are numerous. It is cost-effective, time-efficient, and less adversarial. Moreover, it facilitates the preservation of business relationships—an asset often lost in litigation. Mediation also offers flexibility in procedural design, accommodates cultural sensitivity, and can transcend jurisdictional constraints.

#### B. Nature and Characteristics of Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs)

A mediated settlement agreement (MSA) is the formal record of the outcome reached through mediation. While an MSA is essentially a contract, its legal nature is distinct from that of a standard commercial agreement due to the process through which it is created and the expectations of finality attached to it.

Key characteristics of MSAs include:

- Consensually: The agreement arises from mutual consent, reflecting the voluntary participation of parties throughout the mediation.
- **Informality**: While MSAs can be legally binding, the process leading to their formulation is informal and flexible.
- Confidential Foundation: The confidential nature of mediation extends to the terms and negotiation of the MSA.
- **Diverse Legal Status**: The enforceability of MSAs varies across jurisdictions. In some countries, MSAs can be enforced directly; in others, they must be converted into arbitral awards or court orders.

MSAs often encompass complex commercial terms, future performance obligations, and forward-looking arrangements. As such, their enforceability, particularly across jurisdictions, becomes a matter of significant practical concern for international parties.

## C. Enforcement of MSAs: Domestic and International Perspectives Domestic Perspectives

In domestic legal systems, the enforcement of MSAs depends largely on the applicable procedural and substantive laws. Generally, MSAs can be enforced as contracts, provided they meet the requisite elements of offer, acceptance, consideration, and legal intention. However, in jurisdictions with statutory support for mediation, such as court-annexed mediation or those governed by a Mediation Act, MSAs may be converted into court orders or consent decrees, thereby acquiring the status of judicial enforceability.

For example, in **Singapore**, the Mediation Act 2017 allows parties to record a mediated settlement as a court order, streamlining enforcement. Similarly, **India's Mediation Act**, **2023**, permits registration of mediated agreements, lending them enforceability akin to that of arbitral awards under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

#### **International Perspectives**

Internationally, however, enforcement mechanisms are far less consistent. Unlike domestic cases where jurisdiction and procedural uniformity are more easily managed, iMSAs are complicated by differences in national contract laws, procedural requirements, and public policy exceptions.

Prior to the Singapore Convention, iMSAs lacked a common enforcement pathway. Courts in one jurisdiction often hesitate to enforce a mediated agreement made in another, particularly if local formalities were not met. This legal patchwork rendered the enforcement of iMSAs unpredictable, defeating one of the key purposes of mediation—finality and certainty.

#### D. Challenges in Cross-Border Enforcement Prior to the Singapore Convention Contract Law Enforcement

The most common approach to enforcing an MSA was through contract law—essentially, a party seeking enforcement had to bring a claim for breach of contract. This often required initiating fresh litigation in a court with appropriate jurisdiction,

thereby subjecting the agreement to a range of procedural hurdles. Evidence of the mediation process, signatures, and proof of consent all had to be produced, and the enforcing party bore the burden of proving breach.

This method was not only inefficient but also antithetical to the purpose of mediation. It added delays, cost, and legal uncertainty. Further, procedural rules varied across jurisdictions. In some countries, mediation communications were inadmissible in court, making it difficult to substantiate the MSA. In others, the requirement for notarization, translation, or court approval added further complexity.

#### Arbitral Award Enforcement (New York Convention Analogy)

A workaround sometimes adopted was to convert the MSA into an arbitral award by referring it to a friendly arbitration proceeding. This "consent award" could then be enforced under the 1958 **New York Convention**, which provides a global enforcement framework for foreign arbitral awards.

However, this approach was legally tenuous and procedurally burdensome. Not all jurisdictions allowed arbitration without a live dispute, and critics argued that using arbitration solely to enforce a contract undermined the integrity of the arbitral process. Furthermore, the consent award route added an additional procedural layer, diminishing the speed and cost benefits of mediation

Thus, before the Singapore Convention, no international instrument adequately addressed the unique status and enforcement needs of MSAs in cross-border settings.

#### E. Legal Theories Underpinning Harmonisation

The development of a unified framework for the enforcement of iMSAs is grounded in several legal theories and jurisprudential approaches. These include legal pluralism, the debate between soft law and hard law, and harmonisation and unification theories in private international law.

#### Legal Pluralism

Legal pluralism recognizes the coexistence of multiple legal systems within a given social field. In the context of international mediation, legal pluralism reflects the coexistence of domestic legal regimes, international norms, and hybrid procedures such as investor-state mediation. The enforcement of MSAs often involves interaction between private agreements, procedural laws, and public regulatory frameworks.

A harmonised enforcement mechanism like the Singapore Convention must navigate this pluralism without unduly infringing on domestic legal autonomy. It attempts to strike a balance between respect for local legal systems and the need for transnational predictability.

#### Soft Law vs. Hard Law Approaches

In international law, **soft law** refers to non-binding instruments such as guidelines, principles, and model laws, while **hard law** denotes binding legal obligations enforceable through adjudication. Prior to the Singapore Convention, international mediation was largely governed by soft law instruments—UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002), ICC Mediation Rules, and institutional protocols.

The Singapore Convention represents a shift toward **hard law**, creating binding obligations for states that ratify it. It transforms voluntary mediation outcomes into enforceable legal instruments. This shift is crucial for ensuring that the benefits of mediation are not lost in cross-border enforcement.

#### Harmonisation and Unification Theory in Private International Law

Harmonisation refers to aligning national laws to create compatibility, while unification entails replacing divergent national laws with a single, uniform rule. In private international law, instruments like the Hague Conventions and the New York Convention have pursued these goals with varying success.

The Singapore Convention reflects a harmonisation approach—it does not override domestic laws but creates a common framework for enforcing iMSAs. It builds on the success of the New York Convention but applies it to a different dispute resolution context. The Convention's minimalist design—with limited grounds for refusal and procedural flexibility—aims to facilitate broad adoption while preserving domestic discretion.

#### The Singapore Convention on Mediation: An Analytical Overview

#### A. Historical Development and Negotiation Process

The genesis of the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, commonly known as the Singapore Convention on Mediation (SCM), can be traced back to the growing significance of mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism in international commercial settings. While mediation had become an

increasingly preferred method for resolving cross-border disputes—owing to its flexibility, cost-effectiveness, and capacity for preserving business relationships—there remained a critical gap in the legal infrastructure: the absence of a unified framework for the recognition and enforcement of **international mediated settlement agreements (iMSAs)**.

Prior to the Convention, international legal instruments such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002) provided a foundation for domestic mediation legislation. However, these were non-binding and failed to resolve the pressing issue of enforceability across jurisdictions. Parties seeking to enforce iMSAs had to rely on national contract law or convert settlements into arbitral awards to benefit from the New York Convention (1958), a process that was cumbersome, legally uncertain, and in many cases, ineffective.

Recognising this legal lacuna, UNCITRAL initiated deliberations on a new convention in 2014 through its Working Group II (Dispute Settlement). The process was marked by extensive negotiations involving diverse stakeholders—states, international institutions, mediation practitioners, and legal scholars. After several sessions between 2015 and 2018, consensus was reached on the need for a dedicated instrument that would provide direct enforcement of international settlement agreements arising from mediation.

The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 December 2018, and it was opened for signature on 7 August 2019 in Singapore—a symbolic gesture reflecting the country's leadership in ADR. As of early 2025, over 55 countries have signed the Convention, with several having ratified and incorporated it into their domestic laws.

#### **B.** Key Provisions of the Convention

The SCM is a relatively concise legal instrument, consisting of a preamble and 16 articles. Its provisions are designed to be **simple**, **accessible**, **and flexible**, ensuring ease of adoption and implementation by countries with diverse legal traditions. Among these, **Articles 1, 3, and 5** stand out as central to the enforcement mechanism.

#### **Article 1: Scope**

Article 1 defines the **applicability** of the Convention. It covers "international settlement agreements resulting from mediation" that resolve commercial disputes. The article clarifies that an agreement is "international" if:

- At least two parties have their places of business in different States; or
- The State in which a substantial part of the obligations is performed, or the subject matter is closely connected, differs from the place of business of the parties.
- The article explicitly **excludes** settlement agreements:
- Concluded for personal, family, or household purposes (e.g., consumer or family law disputes);
- Relating to family, inheritance, or employment law;
- That have been approved by a court or concluded in court proceedings and are enforceable as a judgment;
- That are enforceable as arbitral awards.

This scope limitation ensures the Convention focuses strictly on **international commercial agreements** while avoiding overlaps with existing enforcement mechanisms such as court judgments or arbitral awards.

#### **Article 3: Enforcement Mechanism**

Article 3 establishes the **core obligation** of signatory states to **enforce iMSAs** in accordance with their own procedural rules. It provides two key functions:

- Parties may directly invoke a settlement agreement to prove a matter has already been resolved;
- Parties may **apply for enforcement** of the agreement in the courts of a Convention State.
- To invoke the Convention, the applicant must supply:
- A copy of the signed settlement agreement; and
- Evidence that the agreement resulted from mediation, such as the mediator's signature, a document from the mediator/institution, or an attestation from the parties.

The provision promotes **procedural flexibility** and seeks to integrate mediation within the domestic enforcement landscape, similar to how the New York Convention facilitated recognition of arbitral awards.

#### **Article 5: Grounds for Refusal**

Article 5 lays out **exhaustive grounds** upon which a competent authority may refuse to grant relief under the Convention. These include, inter alia:

- A party was under some incapacity;
- The settlement agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed under applicable law;

- The agreement is not binding or has been subsequently modified;
- There was a serious breach by the mediator of applicable standards, or failure to disclose conflicts of interest;
- Granting relief would be contrary to public policy.

These grounds largely mirror those found in the New York Convention, maintaining a **narrow set of exceptions** to reinforce predictability. However, the reference to "**serious breach of standards**" and "**public policy**" introduces interpretive leeway, potentially generating legal divergence across jurisdictions.

#### C. Role of UNCITRAL and Other International Actors

The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) played a central role in developing and promoting SCM. Through Working Group II, it facilitated a collaborative and inclusive drafting process, balancing the needs of diverse legal systems and reconciling conflicting positions among civil law and common law jurisdictions.

Other international actors, including **ICSID**, **ICC**, and **WIPO**, contributed through consultative forums, supporting the Convention's alignment with broader trends in international ADR. Regional organizations like **ASEAN** and **the EU** have also engaged with the Convention, although the EU has adopted a more cautious approach due to concerns about legal overlap with the **EU Mediation Directive**.

The Convention's launch and early adoption have been supported by **UNCITRAL's technical assistance programs**, which offer guidance on domestic implementation, legislative drafting, and judicial training. These efforts aim to ensure **consistency** in interpretation and **harmonisation** in enforcement practices.

## D. Comparison with Other International Instruments

New York Convention (1958)

The Singapore Convention is often described as the "mediation equivalent" of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Both instruments:

- Provide a mechanism for **cross-border enforcement** of privately agreed outcomes;
- Include narrowly defined grounds for refusal;
- Preserve **procedural autonomy** for domestic courts.

However, key differences remain. Unlike arbitral awards, which are adjudicative in nature, iMSAs arise from **consensual**, **non-adjudicative** processes. Enforcement, therefore, requires distinct safeguards to preserve party autonomy while ensuring fairness.

#### **Hague Conventions**

The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) and the Hague Judgments Convention (2019) offer frameworks for recognition of court decisions across borders. While these conventions provide procedural certainty for litigated outcomes, they do not extend to mediated settlements unless those are converted into court judgments.

In this context, the Singapore Convention fills a normative gap, offering an enforcement pathway tailored to the unique characteristics of mediation.

### E. Evaluation of Strengths and Limitations

#### Strengths

#### 1. Simplicity and Accessibility

The Convention's procedural requirements are minimal. A party must merely provide the signed agreement and evidence of mediation. This simplicity enhances user-friendliness and reduces barriers to enforcement.

#### 2. Direct Enforcement

SCM enables **direct invocation** and **enforcement of iMSAs** without the need to initiate fresh proceedings. This feature preserves the efficiency and finality that mediation promises.

#### 3. Neutrality

The Convention is **not institution-specific** and can apply to ad hoc mediations as well as those conducted under institutional frameworks. It avoids privileging any particular mediation model, making it broadly acceptable.

#### 4. Promotes Global Adoption of Mediation

By enhancing legal certainty, the Convention may encourage businesses and legal systems to adopt mediation more frequently for cross-border disputes.

#### Limitations

#### 1. Ambiguities in Definitions

Terms like "mediation" and "settlement agreement" are left undefined or vaguely described. This opens the door to inconsistent interpretation, particularly in jurisdictions with varying mediation laws.

#### 2. Grounds for Refusal are Open-Ended

Provisions like Article 5(1)(e) (public policy) and 5(1)(d) (mediator misconduct) introduce subjective elements. Without uniform standards, these could be interpreted expansively, undermining the Convention's harmonisation objective.

#### 3. Limited Ratification

As of now, many major economies (including the UK, EU member states, and Canada) have not ratified the Convention. This limits its practical utility in disputes involving those jurisdictions.

#### 4. No Supervisory Mechanism

Unlike arbitration (which has institutional oversight bodies like the ICC or LCIA), mediation lacks a global supervisory authority. This can affect quality control and raise concerns about enforcement reliability.

### **Domestic Implementation: Challenges and Comparative Perspectives**

#### A. The Interface Between International and Domestic Legal Systems

The success of any international legal instrument, particularly in the domain of private international law, rests significantly on its **domestic incorporation and operationalization**. The Singapore Convention on Mediation (SCM), while formulated as a treaty to harmonise enforcement mechanisms for international mediated settlement agreements (iMSAs), requires effective **integration into national legal systems** to fulfill its objective.

This interface involves dual-level interaction. On one level, countries must **ratify the Convention**, signaling their consent to be bound by its terms. On another, and more practically significant level, States must enact **domestic legislation** that facilitates the **enforceability of iMSAs** in national courts, consistent with the Convention's principles. Herein lies a central challenge: reconciling the Convention's **broad procedural flexibility** with the **specific legal traditions and institutional capacities** of diverse jurisdictions.

Furthermore, implementation raises questions regarding the **interpretation of Convention provisions** by domestic courts, particularly when terms like "public policy," "mediator misconduct," and "binding agreement" are **undefined or differently construed** across legal cultures. The Convention, though an international instrument, cannot function in isolation from the legal, institutional, and procedural landscape of domestic jurisdictions.

#### **B.** Implementation Challenges for Ratifying States

#### **Need for Domestic Legislation**

Ratification of the SCM is only the first step. The Convention requires implementing States to make corresponding **legislative** and regulatory changes that allow their courts to process applications for enforcement or invocation of iMSAs. Such legislative changes often involve:

- Amending existing mediation laws to include enforcement mechanisms aligned with SCM.
- Introducing **procedural rules** for submitting and evaluating iMSAs under Article 3 of the Convention.
- Providing judicial training and guidance to ensure consistency in applying Articles 3 and 5.

Some jurisdictions may need to address **constitutional requirements** or conflicts between existing laws and the Convention's provisions. For example, jurisdictions with rigid contract enforcement procedures or strict evidentiary rules may find it difficult to integrate the Convention without broader legal reforms.

#### **Judicial Readiness and Interpretive Clarity**

A major hurdle in implementation lies in the **capacity and preparedness of the judiciary**. Since the Convention permits national courts to enforce or reject iMSAs based on limited and specific grounds, judges need to develop **specialized understanding** of mediation processes and standards of conduct.

Interpretive clarity is particularly essential when dealing with **Article 5 exceptions**, which include subjective standards such as public policy or misconduct. Without **uniform judicial training**, the risk of **divergent and inconsistent application** increases, defeating the Convention's harmonisation goal.

#### C. Comparative Analysis of Implementation

#### India: Legal Preparedness and Mediation Laws under Development

India has signed but not yet ratified the Singapore Convention. However, it is actively moving towards aligning its legal framework with international mediation standards. The introduction of the **Mediation Act**, 2023 is a significant step, aiming to provide a comprehensive legal basis for both domestic and international mediation.

While the new Act lays the groundwork for enforcement of MSAs and institutional mediation, **implementation challenges persist**:

- There is a limited judicial precedent on enforcing international MSAs.
- Rules for recognition and enforcement of foreign settlement agreements remain vague.
- The legal culture still leans heavily on litigation and arbitration.

India's ratification of the Convention would necessitate further reforms, including **procedural rules for enforcement** and **training of judges and lawyers** to deal with cross-border mediation issues.

#### USA: Position on Mediation and Convention Ratification

The United States signed the Convention in 2019, signaling strong support for mediation as a commercial dispute resolution tool. The U.S. already has a robust mediation culture, especially in commercial and civil disputes, supported by federal and state-level statutes such as the **Uniform Mediation Act**.

However, as of 2025, the U.S. has not ratified the SCM. Key concerns include:

- The need for **congressional approval** and alignment between federal and state laws.
- Issues surrounding **public policy exceptions** and enforcement procedures.
- Debates over the definition of "mediation" and ensuring compatibility with the American adversarial legal culture.

Despite these challenges, the U.S. remains a likely future ratifier, given its global commercial presence and emphasis on ADR mechanisms.

#### Singapore: Early Adopter and Model Jurisdiction

Singapore has been a frontrunner in promoting mediation and was the first country to ratify the Convention, enacting the Singapore Convention on Mediation Act 2020. It serves as a model jurisdiction, demonstrating how national law can seamlessly integrate with the Convention.

Key features of Singapore's implementation include:

- Clear procedural rules for invoking and enforcing iMSAs.
- Well-established mediation infrastructure through institutions like **SIMC** (Singapore International Mediation Centre).
- Judicial clarity and pro-mediation jurisprudence.
- Singapore's approach exemplifies how legal, institutional, and policy alignment can translate international obligations into effective domestic practice.

#### **UK/EU:** Reluctance and Reasons for Non-Signature

Neither the **United Kingdom** nor the **European Union** has signed the Convention. This cautious stance reflects legal, policy, and political considerations.

The EU has its own **Directive on Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters (2008/52/EC)**, which already mandates member states to facilitate the enforcement of mediation agreements. There is concern that dual commitments to the EU Directive and the SCM could lead to **jurisdictional and interpretive conflicts**.

In the UK, the post-Brexit policy has focused on **regulatory independence**. While the UK promotes ADR, it maintains a preference for domestic enforcement mechanisms under its **Civil Procedure Rules** and the **Courts and Mediation Services** framework.

Concerns about **public policy exceptions**, potential **litigation over mediator misconduct**, and lack of judicial experience in cross-border iMSAs contribute to the hesitation.

#### D. Compatibility Issues with Domestic Laws Exceptions Public Policy

One of the key grounds for refusal under Article 5 of the Convention is that enforcement would be "contrary to public policy." The elasticity of this concept poses risks of overbroad application by domestic courts. What constitutes public policy in one jurisdiction may not in another, leading to potential forum shopping and unpredictability.

To mitigate this, countries must develop **judicial guidance** and perhaps even **model rules** to interpret public policy exceptions narrowly, in line with the Convention's pro-enforcement objective.

#### Formal Requirements of Agreements

In some legal systems, settlement agreements must meet **stringent formal requirements** (e.g., notarization, court approval, or registration) to be enforceable. These requirements could conflict with the **flexible format** allowed under the Convention. Moreover, the Convention's acceptance of various forms of evidence to prove a mediated agreement (mediator's signature, institution certification, etc.) may clash with domestic evidentiary rules, raising **questions of admissibility and authenticity**.

#### **Court Practices and Evidentiary Challenges**

Practical enforcement of iMSAs requires courts to handle evidentiary matters, such as:

- Whether the mediation was truly voluntary;
- Whether the settlement was binding;
- Whether the mediator adhered to ethical standards.

Jurisdictions without clear guidelines on these issues may encounter delays, inconsistent rulings, or refusal to enforce, particularly when facing challenges under Article 5(1)(e) related to mediator misconduct or undue influence.

#### E. Case Law and Emerging Jurisprudence

As of 2025, **case law under the Singapore Convention** remains sparse, given its relatively recent adoption. However, some early jurisprudence is emerging from jurisdictions like Singapore and Qatar, where courts have begun referencing SCM provisions in enforcing foreign MSAs.

For example, Singaporean courts have affirmed the **Convention's intent to streamline enforcement** and emphasized the importance of interpreting Article 5 exceptions **narrowly** to prevent misuse.

Similarly, judicial commentary in some U.S. state courts, although not directly applying the Convention, reflects **growing openness** to the enforceability of iMSAs based on international norms.

In India, while no direct case under the Convention exists yet, high courts have increasingly recognized the **binding nature of mediated settlements**, particularly in commercial disputes, laying the groundwork for future enforcement of international agreements.

## Critical Appraisal: Harmonisation or Legal Tension?

# A. Evaluating the Extent of Harmonisation Achieved The Singapore Convention on Mediation (SCM) was designed to be a cornerstone for the harmonisation of enforcement

mechanisms for international mediated settlement agreements (iMSAs). While its adoption and potential are significant, the actual extent of harmonisation achieved thus far remains **limited and fragmented**. One of the foremost challenges in this regard is the **low rate of ratification**, which has slowed the process of standardizing enforcement. As of today, only a select number of countries have ratified the Convention, and the global landscape remains highly varied.

The absence of uniform global adoption means that, in practice, the Convention's provisions on enforcement are not yet universally applicable. However, those jurisdictions that have ratified it are **moving towards greater coherence** in how they approach international mediation. Countries that have developed domestic mediation frameworks, such as Singapore, have paved the way for others by aligning their systems with the provisions of the SCM. In these jurisdictions, the Convention promises greater predictability in the enforcement of mediated agreements, allowing parties to confidently resolve disputes without the looming concern of non-enforceability.

Despite these advances, harmonisation remains incomplete. **Differences in legal cultures**, especially between common law and civil law countries, complicate efforts to adopt a uniform understanding of mediation and its enforceability. For example, the general resistance to mediation in certain jurisdictions, such as the UK and parts of the EU, presents a **significant barrier** to achieving the broad harmonisation the SCM envisions. Similarly, the legal framework governing mediation varies significantly between jurisdictions, with some countries still grappling with the **institutionalization of mediation**.

#### **B.** Inconsistencies and Grey Areas in the Convention

One of the most apparent challenges facing the Singapore Convention is its **ambiguity in critical provisions**, which raises concerns about its consistent application across jurisdictions. While the SCM's primary aim is to **standardize the enforcement of iMSAs**, certain provisions leave ample room for judicial discretion, which might not lead to the consistent interpretation needed for true harmonisation.

For instance, Article 5, which deals with the grounds for refusal of enforcement, allows states to refuse enforcement based on vague criteria such as "public policy" or "incapacity". These broad terms may be interpreted differently in various

jurisdictions. In particular, countries with robust national policies on mediation or arbitration may invoke these exceptions to **avoid enforcement** if they believe a mediated settlement undermines national legal norms. The ambiguity of these provisions risks **creating inconsistencies** in how courts interpret and apply the Convention, preventing it from achieving the predictable, uniform framework it aims to provide.

Another significant grey area is the **lack of clear definitions** for key concepts such as "mediation," "mediated settlement agreements," and even "enforceability." In some jurisdictions, a mediation that follows specific procedural rules may be seen as an enforceable settlement, while in others, the same agreement might not qualify. This uncertainty complicates the enforcement process, as courts may be forced to engage in complex legal interpretations without sufficient clarity from the Convention itself.

#### C. Balancing Uniformity and Sovereignty

While the Convention's aims to promote **uniform enforcement** of mediated settlements are critical for global legal coherence, this goal often comes into tension with the principle of **sovereignty**. Countries may have domestic policies, judicial systems, and legal practices that are deeply entrenched and resistant to external influences. By adopting the Convention, countries may feel that their **national laws** and traditions are undermined or restricted.

The **reservations provision in Article 8** allows for flexibility, but this flexibility also introduces **exceptions to uniformity**, as states may **limit the scope** of the Convention's application by making reservations or declarations. These reservations may be justified by concerns over **national public policy** or the perceived inadequacy of the Convention's legal structure for specific domestic contexts. For example, some jurisdictions may resist the Convention because they fear it could undermine their **national legal autonomy**.

The inherent conflict between **uniformity in cross-border enforcement** and **sovereign control over domestic legal processes** makes the process of harmonisation under the Convention a challenging one. As a result, while the Convention lays a framework for harmonisation, **sovereign concerns** often prevail, leading to hesitancy or reluctance in ratification and implementation.

#### D. Role of Courts in Shaping Harmonisation

The role of national courts will be crucial in determining the success of SCM. It is within national courts that the provisions of the Convention will be applied, interpreted, and tested. As such, courts will be central in shaping how broadly and uniformly the Convention's principles are adopted. In this respect, courts can either act as drivers of harmonisation or as barriers to the effective implementation of the Convention.

For courts to support harmonisation, they must move beyond the traditional notion of **judicial conservatism** and embrace a more **progressive and international approach**. This includes being open to the idea that **international standards for enforcement**—such as those embodied in the SCM—can co-exist with domestic legal frameworks, provided there is clarity on **enforcement criteria** and sufficient procedural safeguards for parties. Courts also have a role to play in ensuring that the Convention's **grounds for refusal** are applied consistently, avoiding subjective interpretations that would undermine its predictability.

By engaging in judicial dialogues and referencing international case law, courts can **harmonise** their approaches with global trends, thus contributing to a **coherent interpretation** of the Convention across borders.

#### E. Practical Implications for Mediators, Lawyers, and Parties

For **mediators**, the SCM presents both **opportunities and challenges**. While it facilitates a broader range of enforcement options for mediated agreements, mediators will need to ensure that the settlement agreements they facilitate comply with the **legal and procedural requirements** outlined in the Convention. This may involve maintaining rigorous records, ensuring clear and precise settlement terms, and potentially taking on **additional ethical obligations** in the mediation process.

For **lawyers**, the SCM opens up new opportunities in cross-border dispute resolution. They will need to develop expertise in the new **international legal landscape** and understand how SCM interacts with both domestic laws and other international instruments. Lawyers will also need to guide their clients in navigating the complexities of **enforcing mediated agreements**, ensuring that they are drafted in a manner that aligns with the SCM's provisions.

For parties to international disputes, the Convention offers a greater sense of confidence that their mediated agreements will be enforceable in foreign jurisdictions. This removes the concern of unpredictable enforcement outcomes, which often discourages parties from choosing mediation in international disputes. As the Convention's influence grows, it will incentivize the use of mediation, encouraging more parties to resolve disputes without resorting to costly and lengthy litigation or arbitration.

#### F. Interaction with Regional and National ADR Frameworks

The SCM is designed to complement existing **regional and national alternative dispute resolution (ADR)** systems. It does not replace domestic mediation laws or regional ADR instruments but rather enhances them by providing a mechanism for **international enforceability**.

In regions like the EU, where mediation is already institutionalized to a significant degree through instruments like the Mediation Directive, the SCM serves as an extension, offering cross-border enforcement. In Asia, where mediation has been historically underutilized, the SCM provides an incentive for regional ADR growth, helping align mediation practices with global standards.

However, the Convention's integration into **national and regional systems** requires careful management to avoid **jurisdiction overlaps** and to ensure that domestic mediation frameworks are not sidelined by the introduction of international rules. The Convention should be implemented in a way that enhances and supports national systems without overriding them.

#### **Recommendations and Way Forward**

#### A. Legislative and Policy Suggestions for Domestic Integration

For the Singapore Convention to be truly effective, countries must **enact enabling legislation** that aligns with its provisions. This should include:

- Developing **clear definitions** of key terms such as "mediation," "mediated settlement agreements," and "enforcement" in line with the SCM's objectives.
- Ensuring **domestic courts are prepared** to apply the Convention's provisions consistently, possibly through training and **legislative adjustments**.
- Streamlining the recognition and enforcement procedures for international mediated agreements in national courts.
- Countries should also establish procedural rules to govern the process of enforcing iMSAs, thus providing clarity for parties involved in mediation.

#### **B.** Model Rules or Guidelines for Uniform Implementation

UNCITRAL should work with national governments and ADR bodies to create **model rules** or guidelines that can assist in the uniform application of the SCM. These rules could address:

- The **formalities of iMSAs**, including documentation requirements.
- Procedures for **court recognition and enforcement**, including evidence and procedural standards.
- Guidelines on **grounds for refusal** to ensure that states adhere to the narrow exceptions listed in the SCM.

  These model rules could help reduce confusion and ensure a more **consistent approach** to enforcement across jurisdictions.

#### C. Judicial Capacity Building and Awareness Programs

To maximize the effectiveness of the SCM, judicial capacity building is essential. This could involve:

- Training judges on the application of the SCM and its implications for enforcement.
- Workshops on interpreting SCM in light of domestic legal systems.
- Providing **resources for court staff** to understand the procedural nuances of the SCM.

#### D. Promoting Consistency Through International Cooperation and Dialogue

To maintain consistency in the application of the SCM, international cooperation is key. UNCITRAL, along with other international organisations, should promote:

- Judicial exchanges and dialogues between countries that have ratified SCM.
- Annual **conferences or symposiums** for judicial officers and ADR practitioners.
- Sharing of **best practices** in the enforcement of mediated agreements.

#### E. Future Role of UNCITRAL and Global ADR Institutions

UNCITRAL must continue to **monitor the adoption** and **implementation** of the SCM and provide **supporting resources** for countries that face implementation challenges. Additionally, global ADR institutions can play a crucial role in **advocating for the Convention's wider adoption** and supporting national governments in their implementation efforts.

#### Conclusion

The Singapore Convention on Mediation represents a transformative step towards global coherence in the enforcement of international mediated settlement agreements. However, for it to be effective, states must actively engage with the Convention's provisions, courts must adopt a **pro-enforcement stance**, and **international cooperation** must be fostered. By addressing ambiguities, ensuring domestic integration, and supporting judicial capacity building, the Convention can pave the way for a more harmonious global dispute resolution system.

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