Jurisdictional Challenges and the Principle of Complementarity in the Icc’s Functioning

Abstract

This paper critically examines the jurisdictional architecture of the International Criminal Court (ICC), with particular emphasis on the principle of complementarity as enshrined in the Rome Statute. It explores the theoretical foundations and practical implications of this principle, which posits the ICC as a court of last resort—intervening only when national jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to prosecute serious international crimes. Drawing upon authoritative texts, such as the works of William Schabas and Kai Ambos, and policy documents from the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, the study interrogates how complementarity functions within the broader framework of international criminal law. Case studies from Uganda, Sudan, and the Court's engagement with African states illustrate the political and legal tensions inherent in the ICC’s operations. The paper also highlights critiques regarding the selective application of justice and challenges to the Court's legitimacy in non-Western contexts. Ultimately, it argues that while complementarity is a cornerstone of the ICC’s legitimacy, its inconsistent application threatens both its normative foundation and global acceptance.